MSc – Page 2 – projects

Motivation vs coercion

Shared goals, or carrots and sticks?

This blog continues the examination motivation. Social psychological theories on how motivation determines behaviour. Self-determination theory presents the case for suboptimal impact of motives born from persuasion.

Materials cited are sourced from: Ryan, RM., Deci, EI. 2000 “Self-determination theory and the facilitation of intrinsic motivation, social development and wellbeing” American Psychology January 2000, pp68-78

I have lost count of the number of times people have admitted to me that the latest pay rise, bonus, or dream role quickly loses its shine. That salary increase suddenly spent before it arrives just the same. The same issues with the same clients, or bosses, or staff. Many of those conversations returned to mind as I studied at some length the psychological theory on motivation I now summarise in this blog.

From a project management perspective, I think this concepts should grab everyone’s attention. It reinforces something I think we probably all intrinsically know. That carrot and stick management may get us to a point, but it is not going to get us all safely home. Could it even be an obstacle to success? This is another perspective on behaviour, and considerations to address when contemplating how we structure our control.

v | b | t

I will offer a conclusion upfront. When we choose to divide ourselves into them and us by our contracts we are reinforcing the externalised motivations reflected below. When we manage our staff with KPIs, outmoded controls, and seek to retain high performing teams simply with cash, we are reflecting the changed mindset, externalised motivations, performance and health implications that come with that lack of internalised autonomy, shared interest, and shared goal. The more we understand these implications the more visibility there can be. The more we can rethink how we collectively engender coherent behaviours. The more trust between parties we can hope to see.

Self-Determination Theory

In this article Richard Ryan and Edward Deci review their body of research into the impacts of external reward vs our individual intrinsic motivations. At the heart of this research is a reflection upon the social context in which human potential can be fostered or undermined by the manner of motivations we attempt to introduce to those we may wish to direct. Three factors are considered (Ryan and Deci 2000, pp68):

Competence
Autonomy
Relatedness

Each is considered in respect to the developmental tendencies of an individual, but also the wider environmental factors that can antagonise or nurture any of these three (ibid pp68).

What is contrasted is the direction of motivational engagement. Ryan and Deci outline their case in terms of factors that move us to act, be that the intrinsic (internal) motivational factors which are self-generated and arising from innate value and interest in an activity. Or they can be external coercions of persuasion. As Ryan et al advise, “the urge to act either an abiding interest or by a bribe” (ibid pp69). Depending on this source motive, they argue the resulting experience of the actor, and the consequent actions derived, can be highly varied as a result. Those authentic (self-motivated) having more interest, emotional attachment, and confidence in action and therein enhanced performance; and meaning two equally competent people will present different outcomes based only on this origin of motivational force (ibid pp69). These differences are categorised in this theory. Argued to be a continuum of developmental, situational, and progressive characteristics. They conclude that for both the health of the people we oversee, and the performance we hope to tend,

motivation is perhaps the critical variable in producing maintained change
Ryan and Deci, 2000. pp76

Intrinsic motivation is that natural inclination we may have toward “assimilation, mastery, spontaneous interest, and exploration“ (ibid pp70). It requires supportive conditions and can be easily subdued. Ryan and Deci have a sub theory called Cognitive Evaluation Theory (CET) which “focuses upon fundamental needs for competence and autonomy” pp70. To which they conclude even the necessary competence will only support an intrinsic motivation to act when there is retained autonomy in doing so. Arguing such lost autonomy will transfer motives from an intrinsic to an external source. The key claim herein, being that “extrinsic reward can undermine intrinsic motivation” (ibid pp70, citing Deci 1970). Or as separately quote “in attributional terms by an internal perceived locus of causality (deCharms, 1968)” (ibid pp70).

The implication of this is that carrot and stick motivations can become inherently counterproductive to long-term outputs, and to mental health. “…threats, deadlines, directives, pressured evaluations, and imposed goals diminish intrinsic motivation because, like tangible reward, they conduce toward an external perceived locus of causality. In contrast, choice, acknowledgement of feelings, and opportunities for self-direction were found to enhance intrinsic motivation because they allow people a greater feeling of autonomy” (ibid, pp70 citing Deci & Ryan 1985; citing further studies by Amabile 1996; Grolnick &Ryan 1987; Uttman 1997).

The third element identified is relatedness and a connected sense of security. The examples offered being reflective of infant tendency toward exploration as proximal to parents. However, they further argue this relatedness remains into progressive adulthood, “proximal relational supports may not be necessary for intrinsic motivation, but secure relational base does seem to be important for the expression of intrinsic motivation to be in evidence” (ibid pp71).

Self-Regulation of Extrinsic Motivation – if motivational origin is arising from outside influence, the Self-Determinism Theory (SDT) presents differing degrees of such requested behaviour, associated regulated means, and the manner of receipt of such attempted influence. They call this second subtheory “Organismic Integration Theory (OIT)” (ibid pp72, citing Deci and Ryan 1985). Ryan and Deci present this as the categorised continuum, with diagrammatic aid. I present below an adaptation to connect the textual explanations they offer too.

Adapted from Ryan & Deci 2000, figure 1 and notes, pp72-74

I have highlighted the two extremes of extrinsic motivations and pose a question of what our motivational sources become in our contracts of construction, service, or employment, when driven too far towards price, KPIs, and performance bonus. The concluding remarks of Ryan and Deci’s paper highlight cultural differences must be considered, and further that a linear progression from left to right should not be assumed as we individually mature in our many life roles. They do however flag the related implications to mental health when perpetually existing in the left-hand more side of determinism.

employees experiences of satisfaction of the needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness in the workplace predicted their performance and well being at work
(ibid pp75)

To which they present further evidence from studies where an individual could be examined across various life roles, they cite Sheldon et al 1997, who they advise “demonstrated that satisfaction in each of several life roles (e.g., student, employee, friend) relative to the individual’s own satisfaction, was attributable to the degree to which that role supports authenticity and autonomous functioning” (ibid pp76).

Here are two final quotes from their concluding remarks (pp76)

…Excessive control, nonoptimal challenges, and lack of connectedness, on the other hand disrupt the inherent actualising and organisational tendencies endowed by nature, and thus such factors result not only in the lack of initiative and responsibility but also in distress and psychopathology…
…Contexts supportive of autonomy, competence, and relatedness were found to foster greater internalisation and integration than contexts that thwart satisfaction of these needs. This latter finding, we argue, is of great significance for individuals who wish to motivate others in a way that engenders commitment, effort, and high-quality performance…
Ryan and Deci, 2000. pp76

Concluding remarks

One aspect of behaviour that I identified within my 2020 MSc dissertation was the reorientation of project interests dependent upon the party with most influence at time of procurement. In PFI, I argued this was not always the senior debt lender. Risk profile of projects changed as a result. If contemporary revisits of Self-Determinism Theory can be considered from the perspective of actor motivations as entities not just individuals, perhaps these categorisations can offer some means to inform subsets of what those motivational orientations may be.

About Me

In psychology we are required to look beneath the mask. This blog series is attempting to unmask some hidden parts of projects to engender a more collaborative way.

Find my professional mask here:

behaviour, motivation, MSc, psychology

Motivated behaviour

Behaviour as directed by motivations

How much can we explain what we do by our desires to know more, reaffirm we are more, or seeking to reconcile two things that cannot both be so?

All case references herein originating or cited per David Dunning “On the motives underlying social cognition” Chapter 16 of A. Tesser and N. Schwarz. Blackwell handbook of social psychology. Malden, Mass: Blackwell, 2001

Behaviour derived from need

We have begun addressing motivational factors in social psychology this week. The basics of life to keep the body functioning; safety; then belonging, social climbing, and culminating in actualisation – being the best that we can be (cf. Maslow’s hierarchy of needs 1954) or what Carl Rogers called “autonomy” to explain what it is that makes us seek out tasks beyond such basic need (Rogers, 1960).

Behaviour derived from desire not need

But we were asked this week to examine another origin of motivation. What in social psychology is referenced as Social Justice, to explain the motives which direct us to act. It offers explanation for those less obvious motives we may be hiding, or reason for questions we ask, the people we seek to acquaint, and perhaps secretly berate.

desire for knowledge
desire for affirmation
desire for coherence

I briefly describe each.

Desire for Knowledge.

If we know a little, we will seek out more. Trivia, or answers to things we are almost certain we know, we will spend resource to have confirmed anyway (think of the cliff hanger question before the advert break). We will invest time and effort in dismissing or reconciling what is unexpected, just to trivialise if need be. We invest more time in people we think we need to know, whether that be for upside, to avoid downside, or with whom we must compete. We take more interest in causal reasoning after an event, and recall past failures to inform future event. We are proven to be more mindful of our opinions and our actions when we are likely to have to account for them. We will be more critical of argument, more resistant to stereotype, and be more insightful and thoughtful in integrating information when it has impact that leads back to us. We respond more openly to information that aids our own control, but seek information to support our deeds if retrospectively sought. By variance of preference some of us live happily with uncertainly, whilst others routinely seek to narrow fields of interest, compromise or look to shut down too many separate lines of enquiry, or hold stronger to category stereotype to get to certainty quicker – even if quick is less complete. This motive towards closure, plus the underlying trade-off or need for more cognitive detail, combine to make some people judge situations quickly, confidently, but belligerently, and others to not know when to form a judgement at all.

Desire for affirmation

Not all is knowledge based, however. We are also driven by our pride. We may have attributions that explain our success, but external factors to blame for the rest. Our decisions on whether to seek more information and our analysis of the information sought, can be determined by the control we have over the state of affairs this will inform. This can become a deliberative vs implementation mindset – helping a decision vs justification of what was decided upon. In analysis we may be “reality constrained” but nonetheless intent on neutralising information not presenting us in good light. We can spend time elaborating on the merits of traits we possess, and trivialising those we do not. Short-comings demonstrated as common flaws in us all, or seeking to present someone worse at it than ourselves. We may do this directly. We may also do it by implication. Higher performing people shown to be less gracious in praise or assessment of others – unless it is in something of no consequence to themselves. Our choices in social groups, friends, and our just causes, all directed toward our sense of self-worth and our pride.

Desire for coherence

Cognitive dissonance is explained as a felt agitation when two beliefs are inconsistent but both owned. By example, when we are forced to act against our principles we may convince ourselves of validity of both, change one to fit to the other, or find wider reason to hold one in lower regard. The coherence we worked hard to own, we may work equally hard to defended. And if choice has been made between two equally valid alternatives, we will denigrate the one we did not choose. The counterargument here is that we perhaps simply find new perspective. However, where there is clear distance between position taken and belief held, it is demonstrated the dissonance felt will prevail. Such dissonance only felt however if negative impact could arise. Sometimes such dissonance appeals, where such wider view is coveted and we therefore wish to become. Or it may be reduced where wider behaviour could mitigate any negative impact the dissonant conflict may suppose.

v | behaviour | t

All of these summaries are taken from David Dunning as referenced above. He leaves us with a few areas of research to continue. Some I hold as contemporary challenges. And connected to projects.

There is the question of which of these three motivational sources acts with greatest influence. Or indeed if we situationally need to consider all three. He asks at what level does motivation influence social judgement. Is it explicit with conscious control? Or is it implicit, without awareness and therefore presenting less opportunity for individual control? My question, when considering these influences upon our project behaviours, and against our control environments in such a complex arena, is why are we not just assuming it is both?

Dunning reports that research into motivation consistently returns to individual differences. More often so than does cognitive behavioural change. He ponders upon why this would be. And whether it is actually the motives of certain classes of people, rather than human judgements as a generalisation, that give potential to better clues. In my opinion, one possible upside to this observation is if we can extend this premise to project settings. Such as the subsets of project actors in complex construction. Can groupings be found to begin addressing motivation types that can pull interest into or away from a project goal? This I have previously identified as a possibility, per my MSc dissertation from 2020.

A second possible area of further research he identified as cultural differences. Dunning highlighted geographical culture, citing research that had given explanations to individual nuance comparing Japanese and North American differing motivations when faced with self-image threats. Japanese reaction being one of self-development flags vs. North Americans deeming these triggers to defend self-image. That could be considered directly in cultural terms in multinational projects. But I think we could consider industry sectors as having cultural norms too.

Perhaps these two research lenses can be combined. Could projects be typed to give idea of internal dissonance? Differences of understanding between parties themselves? Varying the project settings, this could be layering of the supply chain, and across commercial interfaces between parts of government hierarchy, or the interfaces between the buyer and seller in procurement. Other categorisations of comparison could be available across horizontal sector analysis, or vertical management analysis. Or we could consider this temporally at various stages of a project. Categorising motivations across knowledge, affirmations, and coherence between project actors. Relative power and influence, compared to specifics of motivational themes. Or more closely examining the variance within a single actor and its parts.

The comparisons I am providing of the Construction Playbook, the means of managing accountability within role and responsibility allocations, or the comparison of the High Reliability Organisation to other forms of safety concern, each providing places to pitch such research.

In all cases, perhaps opportunity to research this appropriately will come knocking. Or through my ongoing research and learning, I can formulate an academically sound case to make the enquiry come around the other way. Either way, I continue to find new comparisons and synergies between my risk orientation into the project management world, and that of psychology.

More than this however, I am now observing need in both camps. This social psychology is evolving science, and the project world is a complexity of human process desperately in need of new perspectives. These seem to me two parties in need of some mutual research. One as arena to the other.

In the interim, it remains more than enough to keep me asking more, upskilling more, challenging more, and seeking better perspectives on necessary wider change.

To be continued…

About Me

In psychology we are required to look beneath the mask. This blog series is attempting to unmask some hidden parts of projects to engender a more collaborative way.

Find my professional mask here:

behaviour, david dunning, motivation, MSc, psychology, social psychology

Social Representation

…Everything should be made as simple as possible, but no simpler
Albert Einstein

…I apologize for such a long letter – I didn’t have time to write a short one.
Mark Twain

Where do we, the general public, sit between these two truths? In the modern age we have no time – or no will – to read lengthy explanations. We prefer lowest common denominator, headline grabbing, click bait.

If there is honest intent to maintain truth in explaining cause and effect, psychology might call this stripped bare version “Social Representation”.

Although it must be said even the summaries of theory hardly get us closer to what this represents. From my text book we have these two summaries to help us:

…collective elaborative explanations of complex phenomena that transform them into familiar and simple form
Hogg and Vaughn 2018 pp105.

Their second attempt was:

…simplified causal theories of complex phenomena that are socially constructed through communication contextualised by intergroup relations. Rumour and gossip may play a key role in social representations.
(ibid pp113)

My homework tonight was to explain this in less than 200 words. I think Social Representation is simply:

…what science looks like once filtered through Twitter
author’s own

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199 words

Living without free will

Biology, behaviourism, control

v | b | t

This is a completely different argument of how behaviour can be addressed. It sits in conflict to the ordering of cause and effect I have reflected upon elsewhere. Visibility of this difference an important part of future assessment needs. As an address of behaviour however, it has the same central premise of control at its core.

Whether we trust in free will, society, the individual or the collective, we will have more trust in each other if we share visibility and control regimes of our behaviour that are intended to protect us all.

I have visited two purveyors of alternative perspective on this over the last few days. One I will now be visiting regularly. The other, not so much. Here are my working notes on both. I conclude with some additional observations, which set up additional research intentions and connect these ideas to wider sentiments I have introduced in other blogs.

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Professor Robert M Sapolsky

Professor of Biology, Neurology & Neurosurgery at Stanford University. In reporting upon Robert Sapolsky’s award for Distinguished Scientific contribution, American Psychologist wrote:

For connecting behavior with the neurobiology of stress through pioneering studies on baboons in Kenya and rats in the laboratory, which has opened the way for understanding how the cumulative burden of stress over the life course can accelerate brain aging and predispose an organism to systemic disease. Robert M. Sapolsky’s work has also revealed the synergy among glucocorticoid hormones, excitatory amino acids in the brain, and glucose availability in causing neuronal damage after stroke and seizures. A remarkably lucid and entertaining writer and speaker, in his essays and lectures Sapolsky reminds us of human foibles and illuminates how the social environment and individual personality influence physiology and brain function
America Psychologist November 2013, pp613

This same piece concludes with an outline of his commitment to communicating about neuroscience and its social implications to the lay public (ibid pp615). A quick check on YouTube will confirm his following is significant and his viewership consistently over 500,000 views.

A compelling argument towards the complexity of behaviour is presented in “The biology of humans at our best and worst“. The example scenario used in several lectures, TEDtalks, and podcast interviews is that of a male firing a weapon at a perpetrator who was possibly wielding a firearm but which turns out to be a ‘phone. He asks why did that behaviour occur? And presents the following multi-modal reasoning of contributing factors. The point being all of these modal perspective offer biologically relatable cause in time frames that become evolutionarily long.

1. one second before : what went on in his brain. Amydala activity indicates negative response or action potential is emergent.
2. minutes before : what environmental stimuli influenced his brain. Factors such as smell are considered influencing upon action.
3. hours before : what hormone sensitised him to those stimuli? Testosterone levels can increase the challenge defence response.
4. weeks before : what experiences (e.g. sustained stress) had reshaped his brain to determine how the more immediate forces would be received? Trauma will encourage the physical expansion of the amygdala months prior.
5. from adolescence : how did life experiences (pre-25 year old) impact the immature frontal cortex and shape the adult he became? Numerous external factors contribute to relative maturity and development of the frontal cortex (which is what determines our socialisation abilities)
6. from fetal life and childhood : how did early life experiences cause lifelong change in brain function and influence dormant gene expression? Prenatal stress hormone level have a determining factor from mother to fetal development.
7. from moment of conception : what genes were coded to determine hormone and neurotransmitter response? What variant MAO-alpha gene was inherited.
8. decades to millennia before : how did cultural and social environment come to define life norms, and by what ecological factors did this become the case? Is the cultural norm one of honour and revenge?
9. Millenia : Through gene selections and wider specie development, how did these behaviours evolve? Highly sexually dimorphic behaviours.
Robert Sapolsky “the biology of humans at our best and worst“

At best therefore, Sapolsky argues the causation of behaviour is complex. Across these multi-facetted and time relative perspectives it is this collective of contributions that become the causal factors.

No free will

In a 2020 interview he again refers to these layers of influence toward a behavioural response. They all become one factor. We can be changed by circumstance. We cannot change ourselves. There is no free will. There is no first neurone firing that begins an action, there is always preceding event.

But that does not deny the potential for change

In a very recent interview on the Huberman Lab podcast, 30th August 2021, Sapolsky talks at length about stress, dispels some myths about hormone interactions, and then addresses free will. We can know to know, he says deep into the interview (01:21:08). Change is possible of our mechanical systems, and finding means to build on this framework change, so responses are different. We remain our biology but striving to be better by knowing more means to mechanical change and it’s possibility. Learning that learning changes the brain, that in itself is the knowledge of knowledge becomes the tool of change. Just as protocols or pills are.

No free will, but still reason to seek exposures to externalities that effective change. What I conclude from this is that even if it is only the manner of natural environment that regulates such response – this is still reason enough to be focused upon the betterment of controls.

Before I evaluate this further, I digested one other book this week in search of how behaviour can be measured or controlled. The idea of contingency as cause, sits in this same agentless view of our interactions with the world.

Professor Stephen L Ledoux

“What causes human behavior – stars, self, or contingency” 2018

This recent book is an uncompromising argument as to why behaviourism, or more correctly behaviorology, should be preferred to psychology. The premise being that star sign and psychological addressing of behaviour by any form of agency of self are both little more than mysticism.

By example:-

mysticism – as in untestable or unmeasurable – behaviour – directing agents
Stephen L Ledoux “what causes human behaviour – stars, selves, or contingency?” 2018 pp xvii

In seeking the most contemporary examples of behaviouristic method, this book offers some assistance in this regard and helps contextualise behaviourism more broadly.

Historical context of behaviourism :-

John Watson 1913 denying any private experience is real. BF Skinner from 1930s to 1980s and bringing along “radical” behaviourism and his 1963 paper – celebrating 50 years of behaviourism. To which Professor Ledoux sought fit to compliment with a 100 year version in 2013. It is Skinner inspired Operant Behaviorism (i.e. stimulus evoked response) which is the basis of method presented at some leisure in this book.

There is also some comment on preceding “inadequate” behaviourism dealt with from pp15. Noting early behaviourist denying private (meaning inner) experience completely. To which it is argued Skinner solved in 1963 by arguing we need not preside over the skin as an interface to the evaluative process. Page 16 has physiology claimed as an ally of behaviourism. Emotions nothing more than chemical changes in the body to which in turn result in a feeling in response. Psychology by comparison is not afforded any such ally, I was a little disappointed therefore that the significant interface it now shares with neuroscience was not offered, even passing observation. My own MSc course is closely aligned with both.

The key notes I have taken from this book, I summarise below. There is reason to return to it, and these notes will prompt any such return.

pp30 and pp50 Parsimony – the simplest explanation is generally the most likely true
Pp37 in essence the argument is simply A to B to C. Antecedent to behaviour to consequence.
Pp38 antecedents as IV and most often one of multiple stimuli of which one or several may have contingent cause as the antecedent(s)
Pp39 behaviour is termed response in specific circumstances
Pp40 consequence being the varied operant effect becoming chapter addresses of the later book.
Pp41 C can also be reinforcing stimuli (SR)
Pp43 1987 TAEB The experimental analysis of behaviour
Pp63 what is NOT behaviour. Growth or decay; traits;
Pp76 bodily functions as stimuli; Pp77 emotional arousal as physiological stimuli
Pp85 controls as part of the environment. Behaviour control environment
Pp85 law of cumulative complexity
Pp86 responses are put in to classes (response class) where the regulatory of a response class may be measured her time e.g. dishwashing x times in 7 days.
Pp87. Behaviour classes are : motor behaviour (movements)
Pp88 emotional behaviour as glands stimuli for example
Pp89 functional classification – respondent behaviour (Pavlov); operant behaviour (Skinner)
Pp92 natural law controls ALL behaviour
Pp120 diagram of multiple contingent for reflexive; Pp121 non-reflexive; Pp123 generalisation – in conditioning; pp124 stimulus generalising; Pp126 evocation – evocation training – SR feeds energy back to nervous system and evokes us to respond differently
Pp129 function altering stimuli; Pp133 covert neural behaviour cf Fraley 2008; Pp141 positive or negative same as reinforcing or punishing postcedents; Pp151 types of reinforcer; Pp153 extinction of respondent when no longer able to elicits response; Pp169 shaping; Pp179 chaining; Pp191 fading procedure; Pp199 schedules of reinforcement; Pp217 assertive controls and 8 coercion traps; Pp273 overt and covert; Pp279 passivity

I now want to briefly reflect upon a confrontational tone of argument in this book. One hard to reconcile as coming from the academic class.

These next notes are prepared to support discussion within my MSc tutorials. We are mid-debate regarding the place of disciplinary dialogue and range of arguments that must be understood if the various arms of psychology, social psychology, cognitive psychology, biology, neuroscience, and wider behavioural sciences are to be understood. The sustained attack by this author is thereby captured below for representation with my fellow students. Here are some quotes reflecting the uncompromising dismissive attitude directed at psychology.

we consider Skinner’s radical behaviorism, the philosophy that extends naturalism to inform the natural science of behavior that today we call behaviorology, after its separation from the non-natural, fundamentally mystical discipline that defines itself as studying “behavior and the mind”, (pp7)
the relation between behaviorology and psychology approximates the relation between biology and creationism (pp9)
but if natural scientists instead compromise by allowing claims that behavior in general … results from the spontaneous, willful act of some putative inner agent, then they lose the whole subject matter of human behavior – a subject matter whose application is likely vital for human survival – to purveyors of non-science (pp10)
with these processes, or sub parts, like id, ego, motive, choice, or trait, we cannot trace the behaviorological, physiological, chemical, or physical links of a natural functional history chain; we can only trace the causal chain back to the supposed spontaneous wilful act of the self agent. This breaks the chain of events in the natural functional history and so further excludes psychological analysis from natural science (pp11)
no capricious inner agent makes responses occur (pp17)
with much scientific activity involving methods, anyone using scientific procedures, even mystical people, can objectively collect data on any real phenomenon (pp19)
the general result of this development [1987 split of behaviorolgy as a separate discipline] is a foundation natural science related to all other natural sciences, not at the discredited level of body-directing self-agents, but at the level of a body’s physics based interactions with the external and internal environments (pp19)
some disciplines studying behaviour fall for overly complex accounts (e.g. minds, psyche, selves, souls, or many other types of putative behavior-initiating self-agents), (pp32)
[of agentialism] as a result psychology began as a non-natural discipline, and remains so today, (pp43)
it [psychology] even defined itself as “the study of behavior and the mind”, as it stuck to its secular (i.e., non-theological) version of mysticism. (pp43)
…”the demon-haunted world” Carl Sagan (1995) referred to science as “a candle in the dark”. We must turn that candle into a floodlight exposing the whole variety of unhelpful accounts for behavior while illuminating the helpful accounts for natural behavior science, and thereby support the tole of this science in helping solve local and global problems.. (pp50)
as science expanded, the fictional accounts for most phenomena have retreated. Today, fictional accounts generally still thrive only with respect to human nature and human behavior (pp51)
many scientific and other authors would welcome linguistic changes that allow them to write without automatically implying inner agents (pp52)
Stephen L Ledoux “what causes human behaviour – stars, selves, or contingency?” 2018

The most telling lesson in behaviour I take from this book is to retain a level of respect and dignity in academic writing, and at least have the good grace to keep current with arguments opposed to ones own. My reading of the likes of Robert Sapolsky suggest this more constructive dialogue approach to advancing subject matter still sits alive and well.

—//—

Additional observations to build upon in due course

Two quite separate sets of thought are racing since Robert Sapolsky reframed the more biological-neuroscientist perspective on human decision-making.

Firstly that we have little if anything to do with the immediate decision-making process beyond having ownership of the biology we contain;

Second, that what do have is ability, and perhaps therein a responsibility, to be putting ourselves into the path of passing circumstance that offers better versions of those parts in us that effect wider event.

By Robert Sapolsky’s own admissions it is hard to reconcile with the second part. The second part being how we live without free will. How are we to remain morally governed or even inclined if we have no directive part in the play? How can we remain accountable for our actions and inactions. Why bother to give thought to anything at all? That is, however, to assume there is also pre-destiny. And of that I remain unconvinced. Nor is it, in my opinion, where Sapolsky’s account is directed.

How is this related to projects | within projects?

Modelling of complexity

Robert Sapolsky is presenting the challenges of addressing numerous levels of systems. Biological systems with huge complexity. Therein the realities of influence that relate to distance. The more layers one must pass through, the less influence we can expect to have. In the Limbic System he argues (lecture 14 of his 2010-2011 Human Behavioural Biology series), that this is measured in the number of synapse a message must cross through. In the world of construction projects I equate this to the commercial contracts across a supply chain. The more layers there are, the less influence the employer has over the lowest sitting links. The solution in both cases is creating extra pathways to override, intercept, or simply have visibility of interventions from elsewhere.

Sapolsky also reflects upon prior history as effecting current action potential. This is much the same as the history of our supply routes, cultural ties, beliefs, laws, customs, and propensity to revisit old wars. Much the same as within one organisation it is only in understanding the history of takeovers, mergers, successful relationships with clients and suppliers, shared relationships or long-standing feuds, that one can begin to better understand why the infrastructure of that business works in suboptimal or counter-intuitive ways. Furthermore, just as evolution is quick to punish outdated modes of being, so too does economics and cash-flow quickly reward those frameworks of processes finding work arounds to past solutions that are now in the way.

v | Behaviour | t

Firstly, returning to the challenge to free will. For purposes of my projects research free will or not seems less of a concern than to acknowledge behaviour is still a subject of potential control. It matters only that we know there is potential for change. This is Robert Sapolsky’s key point in arguing there is still reason to seek better ways.

Second, the point at which Robert Sapolsky seems less sure of how we then set ourselves up to live. My work around is taking the position that the resulting actions are not predetermined even if we are not directly acting with agency or otherwise. We can get to know the appropriateness of the controls. Influence the manner of the control. As Sapolsky says repeatedly, “we can know to know”. I would add that we can know why to know. We can seek to know what better control is and why, and let the process of converting action potentials within neurones worry about themselves. Our project controls at all levels need to account for such unpredictability regardless how the actions come to pass.

Modal confusion

There is also modal confusion addressed here. Robert Sapolsky makes a fabulous case for the multi-layered influences of our behaviour. That all of these factors can have impact, and that to look upon one mode alone is to miss the complexity that unfolds.

By example of this modal flexing, Robert Sapolsky talks of the amplification of actions where elevated testosterone plays a part. That it is society that rewards action and therein the challenge defence that testosterone helps reinforce. But this is not aggression. It is society that rewards the selfish, assertive, dominating types. Testosterone is defending challenge to status. But it is society determining what factors status is derived. Sapolsky’s observations are that it is therefore at a societal level we can hope to have some control. If we reward more kindness with more status, challenges to status will have testosterone fuelled kindness as the follow on. These become nudges toward a direction of travel. My question here is simply do we collectively think our direction of travel could be better, and if so what control of our meta-systems better reflects that goal?

My point here is that this is precisely the observation of our interactions themselves. That our own conflicting intentions become nuanced by our interactions with others, and [the illusion of] ourselves. But that in all cases there is potential for change. Not needing to be born of free will, but nor relevant if not. Change, born out of influence of the control environments we create. The modal level of risk we are addressing becomes critical to this assessment.

Accountability and responsibility

Victims one and all?

Next is the issue of whether free will is the only means by which we can give justification to holding an individual accountable, or least responsible for their actions. Robert Sapolsky argues that our justice systems are a leading edge of reform need. Not arguing that we let danger to society loose upon the streets, more that we have a little more empathy to the reason they the criminal actors are so broken at all. Controversial, emotive, and itself a position to polarise the lay persons he is reaching toward. A worthwhile debate but for my part, I sit opposed.

Responsibility without blame

Whether we become radical behaviourists like Skinner, hold out for the idealism of mind over matter, or allow a dualism of mind and body in any order of influence or prioritised proof of anything at all, there is a level of amalgamations of systems of interaction that we identify with as a whole.

Here again I see projects and organisational thinking troubled by the same modal confusion. I have previously written about how accountability can be retained whilst responsibility shifts between layers of engagement. I think this same principle can be applied in downward layers of attention without necessitating a reductionism towards subatomic physics. Not that Robert Sapolsky would disagree with that, at least as a pro or con towards free will. He argues that the necessary “bubbling up” from quantum mechanics to synaptic levels of biology are not feasible; they offer nothing positive toward a less random decision ability if free will is argued for; or offer a uniform influence across the trillions of synaptic messages that would therein have to all conform.

My point is that regardless of whether we think an individual wills an action or not, society functions at this higher level of control. We are all individuals by that metric. Regardless of whether that is an amalgamation of systems. Or whether consciousness or self determined agency are illusory. Both still reflect a contained system and with it one scale of control. Accordingly, we legally and in personal judgements hold these levels of a whole as stand alone. We are each that collection of systems, that illusion of self. And the human version of collaboration which our frontal cortex helps us navigate better than other animal systems, becomes the beginnings of wider human derived societal controls.

We can address accountability and responsibility in these same terms. The key point is to be clear in the modal level of engagement we are working from. It is these social laws that we deem consent to be age related. Or what constitutes acceptable exchange of chattel. Or what organisational complexity and what hierarchical order we attach and seek reward. This is the what. The containment of a social system we should know to know.

Concluding remarks

Free will or otherwise, we are all responsible for the societal, organisational, or moral controls past down to us. We are personally responsible to ensure we agree they are right, or make peace with how we reconcile that they are wrong. We also each retain responsibility for what we have been handed down, and accountability for what we pass on further therein. This is the burden of management of others. And the stewardship and duty in leadership that most attempt to evade.

I am therefore encouraged by the congruent conclusions all theory and science across these disciplines seems to land upon – at least from what I have found so far. To my mind (or the illusion therein), this still becomes a question of behaviour, and the manner of control.

This remains immensely complex, but perhaps able yet to be bettered by the nature of control.

About Me

In psychology we are required to look beneath the mask. This blog series is attempting to unmask some hidden parts of projects to engender a more collaborative way.

Find my professional mask here:

accountability, behaviour, behaviourism, change, cognitive, decision-making, environment, MSc, plastic brain, project controls, psychology, responsbility

Psychology

Today’s blog is a brief overview of how some key elements of psychology sit together.

This is a working model I began building out 18 months ago. It will no doubt be subject to change as I progress in my more formal MSc Psychology learning.

Historic groupings of psychology and connecting fields

About Me

In psychology we are required to look beneath the mask. This blog series is attempting to unmask some hidden parts of projects to engender a more collaborative way.

Find my professional mask here:

MSc, psychology

Is seeing, believing?

What truth can we know from sensed perspective?

This blog is a brief summary of my own thoughts before going into tutorial discussions this week. It might be interesting to post a before and after perspective to a great question set within my cognitive psychology module this week.

Group question: What does the distinction between sensation and perception imply when discussing one’s “truth”? If there are, in fact, multiple “truths” what does the lack of objective reality mean for scientific psychology?

I had a few immediate pithy sentences come to mind. Who do you believe? The truth is out there… You can’t handle the truth! Is the truth even knowable?

I was tempted to reflect upon philosophical truth in wider sense but personal truth seems hard enough. The hard problem…

Physiological truth

The bounds of our experience are closely connected to our senses. Therein how we interpret the information received. Technology allows us to expand some of the ranges of our senses but even with this expanded translation of reality we perceive, interfaces are crossed between us and the reality known. If indeed reality itself is more than a belief.

Even without artificial aid, the sheer scale of data we gather is extraordinary. From lecture materials just read, the precision of the data captured by our eye is almost innumerably complex. The interconnections of cells and pathways connected to sight are 100,000,000,000^4,000which presents more possible connections than there are atoms in the universe. From this unimaginably large array of data connections – once over whatever interface exists between reality and perception – we can then process what we determine to be thousands of objects at any one moment. To which data we may add touch, hearing, smell, and taste; bodily awareness and spacetime positioning. Even considering just the relays of these receptors not all is fully understood. By example, there are receptors in our skin we know exist but only best guess their purpose.

Perceived reality

What then of the processing itself? We have innate abilities considered unique in the animal world. Our physiological orientation associated with touch concentrated in body parts unlike other mammals. Our tongue physiologically more acutely connected by touch than cats, or dogs, rabbits, or rats. Our fingers more intimately registering a range of touch. Klatsy et al. (1985) 95% of 100 common objects (e.g. fork, brush, paper clip) correctly identified by blindfolded subjects i.e., identified by ‘feeling’ them. At some point in our anthropology, tongues enabled sound to be morphed into repeatable and more complex phrases of noise. The dexterity of our opposable thumbs offering information gathering potential and control enough to mould and craft.

The brain’s Somatosensory cortex receives and processes the layers of information derived from touch. Each skin location is represented by a corresponding cortical area (orderly ‘topographic map’ of body). The processes space in the brain demonstrated to be greater for some areas of the body than others.

*(Graphic source unknown but adapted from Penfield, W. & Rasmussen, T. The cerebral cortex of man. New York: Macmillan, 1950, via UoN lecture notes)*

This is a mapped area of the Somatosensory cortex. Devised from Penfield & Rasmussen, 1950 work on patient responses during brain surgery. The amount of cortex are reserved for more sensitive skin areas are represented by larger areas of cortex where ‘more neural hardware’ is present.

Not mentioned in these lectures was a wider comparison of other more distant specie relations. The octopus has the same number of neuronal cells as a dog (~500m), and twice that of a cat. Yet only 10% of those are in each of it’s two brains, with the majority of the rest divided equally in each of its eight arms. Our principle sense is sight – imagine that! The octopus dominates its perspective via its sense is smell – through its skin. It also has semi-autonomous ability to morph specially adapted skin to mimic hue, form, and texture of the environment it is in. How different must the organisational structures be to have more decision-making made near the source. The High Reliability Organisation of the animal world. Here then are senses and interactions with a less centralised perception in a range of information alien to our own. What truth does it smell that we cannot see?

Intentional change

Crucially and uniquely, is our capacity to imagine and to symbolically rework information into repeatable and transient inner form and temporal bound. Within these mechanisms we gain insight. We predict. We learn. We find ways to repeat, communicate, and adapt. I am yet to encounter the psychological explanations for this within this course, but other reading informs me this is unique to us. Noam Chomsky is on our syllabus but not until next term. Crucially this symbolism enables intervention, interpretation, adaptation and theme. A rework of information as translated from nature whilst not fully knowing what that necessarily means. We operate through best guessed grey spaces. Summarise, approximate, prioritise. We predict based upon imperfect information, errors, and change. What is truth when there is always a necessary approximating and therefore an unknown?

Scientific truth

By what measure can we deem science as singular truth? And by extension therefore psychology. As examples, Aristotelian revisions by Galileo. Newtonian physics revised by Einstein who for twenty plus years thereafter resisted but slowly accepted the notion of quantum mechanics – which his theories cannot fully square. Within living memory for many was the witness of the Kuhn vs Popper debate which pitted the historic realities of the settled science practices vs the acclaimed scientific method of falsification, which Popper advocated was our norm but which Kuhn reflected upon as no more than an ideal. Reality vs best practice therefore not harbouring singular truth – or at least not for long. Within this framework of discourse sits the question of whether mathematical precision can ever replicate what our limited instruments of measurement can perceive as real. And to what extent the bounds of human knowledge and sensory perception can be extended by the technology we build – and may one day soon be replaced.

Moral and ethical truth

Kant, Hagel, Nietzsche or Foucault all parked for another day. Here I will only dwell upon legal truth – as onus of proof. In the narrowest of definitions here sit more interfaces of truth. Innocent until process demonstrates guilt. The ownership of a better, more believable, subjective truth. The intent or the transit by a letter in the post assumed sent. Or the intentions of words – contract or intent – hermeneutics – at the risk of the drafter or interpretation of the reader as forever at risk of latter-day revisits of old truths. New science to old facts. Fingerprints or DNA affording hidden reality to be revealed. All of which requires a level of trust in the moral and ethical agreements of people, and the technology by which we rely. We have a sensed record and perception of its meaning, but is this ever unquestionably right, or unequivocally true?

Socratic discourse, know more to know we know less

This is a group question for debate amongst peers this week. A moment of perhaps coming to our senses or a sense check of what is known. Offering perhaps a sensible solution. Perhaps seeing is believing as we push this around all week. Even if we collectively agree on what we think we might know, can we be sure we agreed to the same thing? Can we be sure we communicated it without error? Can we ever really know anything? Or just hope to narrow the gap on the unknown.

In truth, Socrates was probably right. If Plato’s writings in his name are to be believed. To be wise, is to know we do not know…

About Me

In psychology we are required to look beneath the mask. This blog series is attempting to unmask some hidden parts of projects to engender a more collaborative way.

Find my professional mask here:

MSc, philosophy, psychology, Truth

Personality or group?

Here is sneak peak at the introductory remarks in my social psychology discussions this week. Already putting what I thought I knew on shakier ground.

Behaviour first

The work of the Behaviourists. Pavlov may ring a bell but this moved into areas of positive reinforcements before becoming more integrated with less observable matters such as feelings and belief. Or the social learning theory which still feeds the perhaps exaggerated thinking that we imitate what we see e.g., TV violence makes us violent. None of these theories seem central to what I am being prepared to learn next.

Cognition first

Cognitive theories are still on trend. It is being taught as a separate subject this term in its own right. It is also dominant in social psychology where our cognitive processes may translate into attitudes, the modelling we initiate, and behaviours they influence.

Related perhaps is the neuroscience that gives markers and imagery of brain activity. And biochemical interactions within the brain or hormonal markers we can extract. All being considered against associated socialised thinking and behaviour.

Genes first

Evolutionary theories where perhaps particular traits or complex social behaviours offered advantage to some who became genetically dominant.

Group first

Or this final either/or reflection which really caught my attention tonight. Whether the individualistic traits or personality differences we all consider to be settled science are anything but. That perhaps it is not our personality that determines how we behave in socially constructed groups. But that it is the socially constructed groups that we then internalise and by which become behaviourally normalised to us. We all behave differently in situationally determined ways. That is current research and exploration at large in the evolving science of psychology.

Are we managing our projects, or our projects managing us?

Just as our project management world is beginning to embrace trait theory. Our red leaders in DISC, or our ENFJs in Myers Briggs. Our Big 5s and our psychometric tests. Just as our projects start adjusting our behaviours to account for our traits, is psychology going to turn us about? To tell us we need to adjust to our projects, as it is our social groupings that are determining how we behave? Not starting with how we behave, or the traits we think we own, but determining how the projects we inhabit influence how we behave.

Stay sceptical and look up

All I know for sure right now is my “mediator” traits, as both an Enneagram Type 9 and Myers Briggs INFJ, are both seeking to diplomatically find some middle ground. My DISC yellow is just enjoying the chance to talk it through. But just like Arthur C Clarke, we both draw the line at star-signs. Both being Sagittarius we are far too sceptical to fall for that…

About Me

In psychology we are required to look beneath the mask. This blog series is attempting to unmask some hidden parts of projects to engender a more collaborative way.

Find my professional mask here:

DISC, enneagram, infj, MSc, myers briggs, personality, Project, psychology, star signs, trait

v | b | t in research projects

How was the first week back in big school?

This MSc is going to be a little different. Here’s a few early observations about being back at university again.

42 students together in spirit. Globally spread. No lecture theatres. No face to face time at all. This is designed to be a remote access, part-time, anytime course. It seems to be a great way to learn.

My first week in psychology, and immediately being pulled away from my understanding of psychology so far. I was all about Jung vs Freud, trait theories, psyche and Self. Early modules are promising Cognitive Psychology, Social Psychology, and a double helping of research method and advanced stats. This is going to be different.

I have a personal tutor. My third visit to university, but my first tutor that is formally assigned to me. Normal practice at Nottingham. Certainly not seen before by me. This is going to be different.

The introductions to each subject have dived straight into the discourse. The contemporary debates. The touch points with other disciplines. The cut and the thrust. Sociology sits here, psychology sits there. Or do they? What an insightful way to start. This is going to be different.

All in all I am pretty happy with what I’ve seen. There is energy. There is freshness. Contemporary papers immediately in hand. Experiment and free discussion, psychological safety to throw around ideas. The standards are high. The discourse necessarily hard. This is going to be different.

v | b | t

Visibility seems high. Behaviours expectant, challenging – but with controls intentionally set to safe-mode. No doubting the trust. The selection process was thorough, and we now seem in the best of capable hands.

Against such scrutiny, access to learning, and contemporary challenge and research now at my door, the biggest threat to v | b | t right now is probably the concept and all its hidden flaws…

This is going to be different.

Already I think, so am I.

About Me

In psychology we are required to look beneath the mask. This blog series is attempting to unmask some hidden parts of projects to engender a more collaborative way.

Find my professional mask here:

degree, masters, mature student, MSc, psychology, research

Introductions have changed

Because university is about taking safe risks

This is the introductory video I have just posted within my distant learning shared space with fellow students. Lockdown, distant learning, time zones constraints, all reflecting 21st Century challenges and opportunity to experiment in relative safety. In about a minute we were each asked to introduce your why in psychology.

An introductory experiment

Can two messages be offered together, one per mode of communication?

I took a few risks here. One of early transparency in offering more information than people needed to know. But it seemed contextually relevant – this is a psychology course after all.

The next risk was sailing as close to the boundary of the brief as I dared. Video format was required – but I decided that didn’t mean I had to be in it, just the subject of interest.

The final risk was the experiment. A double up of the content in the time frame. Could I sneak two messages into one. From my first MSc, a module on Visualisation of data introduced us to the work Edward Tufte, one of the stalwarts and pioneers of the craft. My professor taught us to be bold and to present as much as can be understood in the space; Tufte taught me that using two modes for one data representation was a waste. Why therefore feel compelled to use visual and sound mediums to convey the same thing? The answer is of course that the density and comparison offered can become confused, and all can be lost. As this was a brief message, and as I suspect all can listen then watch, or watch and then listen, I could leave it to the user to decide if either or neither message could be followed via watching, or listen, and maybe both.

There are no marks awarded for this presentation. So my only real risk is one of reputation, or confusion, or both. All are retrievable, or perhaps rightly earned, so I dared to be different in a control environment in which I immediately feel safe (per the lessons from sociology via Tracy Brower, that I blogged at length about yesterday and the day before).

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About Me

In psychology we are required to look beneath the mask. This blog series is attempting to unmask some hidden parts of projects to engender a more collaborative way.

Find my professional mask here:

communication, educated risk, experiment, introductions, MSc, psychology, trust, visualisation

Fresh faced for freshers’ week

1991 Freshers’ week vs 2021 Freshers’ week

30 years separating these two starts to university. 30 years, a city career, a temporary mortgage, a forever marriage, a pretty reasonable life. One I am rebooting now.

1991-1994

Living on the South Coast. Working my summers as a harbour tours commentator since age 16. A level results confirm the 20 points needed for my conditional offer at my preferred choice University, Cardiff. Maritime Studies, my preferred subject. A pause to the debate of whether my life was, like my father, destined to be at sea. Option B was Economics, Kingston Polytechnic.

Young Enterprise regional winner. A level economics, grade A. Better at business than biology – no change there

Then late September 1991. Freshers’ week. Still looking about 12 years old but evidently able to get served in a bar.

Seemingly more than one…

Days I look back on with some fondness. I found a freedom. I found the pub. Uni is where I met my wife – she must have been looking for a project then. I consult within, and research around, the risks impeding projects now.

Second year, 1992 me, still living as a young one indeed.

Eventually, I even found the lecture theatres and the library. Looking back my 2:2 was probably well deserved, but that was a sting I felt long and buried deep. A dissertation mistake that cost me dear. Living to the brief of my local government client, not the needs of the degree. I did so much wider learning here.

2021-

The 2021 me has returned to long hair. Less rebellion, and more compliance with lockdown need. I didn’t need to shave in 1991 – I just don’t bother now. I have grown into my Beardall name.

Never further from maritime influence than now. Never looking more like I have been at sea for 30 years…

No longer young but a modest enterprise still. My consulting work in construction pays the bills. My latter day interest in psychology intent on bringing a little biology back into the complex project space.

Today was a day of turning a house upside down, my parents doing the same to theirs, and a 32 year old document is duly found. And a few old photos.

Nottingham University having conditionally approved my MSc place in Psychology, but insisting I evidence a GCSE grade C in mathematics from 1989. My MSc distinction in Project Management, Finance, and Risk from 2020, a career in risk and insurance due diligence in project finance, none of that an acceptable work-around. Lock-down, remote working, no means to get out. Still no means to register until the GCSE cert is found. A compliance box frantically now ticked.

So how do these two Freshers’ weeks compare? I have no idea, I am not there. I await my instructions for registration. But I was never going near campus this time anyway. Just sat here, quietly getting on with work and research. Delighting in the memories found in some photos of 30 yesteryears.

I do know I availed the sting of my 2:2, with my 2020 MSc. The library I found has claimed me eventually. More so than the sea. Being young was fun. But my third university visit, this one prepares me for a PhD.

Join my journey back to university for a third time.

This blog space will be my place to introduce psychology to projects, risk, and people management. There is a clear research aim here, and this time it is my brief. But I am in no rush. I will be taking time to understand, time to share, time to reconsider much learned in yesteryear.

About Me

In psychology we are required to look beneath the mask. This blog series is attempting to unmask some hidden parts of projects to engender a more collaborative way.