The Construction Playbook

Author: Warren Beardall

HM Government Construction Playbook

What role does it play? What impact is intended? Analysed using visibility | behaviour | trust

This blog has been prepared as another test using my experimental method of evaluation through the concept of visibility | behaviour | trust. According to the Construction News the CBI want implementation by public sector to begin quicker. I am trying to find evidence of project procurement having everyone’s welfare at heart, and not just that of the project initiator. So how does the Construction Playbook stand up under this lens?

Context of what follows

My research and attention is asking whether we set our projects up in ways that offer greatest likelihood of success, but necessarily having all project actors welfare within the definition success therein means. My premise being that projects of cooperation only become projects of collaboration when all those invited are intended to be actively within the sentiments of no harm. My assertion that it is better for all our projects if intended to be assessed in this way. Thereby having long-term benefit of this project, but also that of the next as central to the collective business case we should all have in mind.

Does this Construction Playbook therefore have your welfare, the jobs of your employees, your future training and planning needs in mind? Does it have the long-term health of our country and our future project needs in mind. Is it immune to the political vagaries and short-term passing of government terms of office. Is the infrastructure of our administrators of state better guided by this Construction Playbook. Are we?

Or is this just a public sector bringing its own house in order. With less strategic intent and more short-term shoring up. Is the path being set in this guidance one of better collaborations? Or is it leading us all toward new ways of doing old self-serving things under new labels and old deferrals of blame?

This assessment was written between January and March 2021. A number of discussions have been shared since with both academic and industry friends and colleagues. All opinions herein are mine alone. But they are sentiments shared.

Examination of the text

The Construction Playbook : Government Guidance on sourcing and contracting public works project and programmes. Version 1.0 December 2020.

The Construction Playbook has a wide industry sponsorship. It presents significant progress in seeking more consistent approaches to government procurement.  It attempts to remove the singular cost focus of procurement; reinforces a wider sentiment by central government to adopt more strategic and long-term procurement practice; and demands greater upfront preparation and earlier market engagement.

It further introduces an expectation on government departments to apply this overall approach, and to be judged against its requirements.  It advocates more focus upon modern methods of construction (MMC).  More focus on supporting manufacturing ethos within construction.  It states that supply chains should expect to be able to make fair profit.  It advocates cross-departmental buying practices. Standardisation of delivery requirements.  More component and design standardisation across projects, regions, and sectors.  And more consistency and more clarity on key outcome expectations and roles.

Examination with v | b | t

The majority of my analysis here is presented as addressing the behaviours of projects actors. As does the Playbook, itself. This is observed as being principally focused upon the behaviours of the public sector parties, with much of the playbook a reflection upon the controls therein applied separating public sector engagement with private sector, rather than contemplating the controls to govern both. Notwithstanding the collaborative sentiments therefore, I conclude a them and us relationship is being developed from the start. My examination of all that follows highlights and thereafter reflects upon what behaviours this is inviting, intentional or otherwise.

Visibility | b | t

Sharing this Construction Playbook gives a visibility to all parties intending to engage with government procurement in the coming years. Much of the literature being generated through industry interactions is now busily being directed by this clarity, and the stated intended universal application of the Construction Playbook across all of government and public sector.

Within the examination that follows are recurring themes. There is a lack of clarity on the how. Or how to prioritise the what. Some what necessarily contradictory or conflicting with others. The visibility of such prioritisation is therefore assumed to only exist at more localised level. How such priority is to be translated and assessed between local and central expectations remains unclear as a result.

With this reduced visibility, the interpretative space may be opportunity for some. From a risk perspective however, this suggests future scope for split motivations, localised confusion, and possibility of agenda manipulation by those best placed to influence and conflate. These are precisely the interface risks I deem to be the source of much of the risk we introduce into projects, simply because of goal creep, goal division, and the grey space it encourages.

v | behaviour | t

The majority of my analysis sits within these behavioural intentions or implications. Ordering of this more detailed examination follows the ordering of the Construction Playbook itself.

Behavioural changes by Public Sector are offered from the outset

Introduction – “Right at the start” (pp2-3) prepared by Gareth Rhys Williams – Government Chief Commercial Officer; and Nick Smallwood – Chief Executive, Infrastructure and Projects Authority.  I have reordered these key sentiments into what I believe to be three main categories of interest:

Thinking in new ways: thinking of risk, sustainability, and programmes systemically; sector health; productivity and addressing skills shortages in the long term. Advocating front loading of effort, longer lead times for quicker finishes.

Key benefits desired: Outcome based; long-term partners; standardising designs, components, and interfaces; innovation and MMC; win-win contracting for better outcomes; better financial awareness and preparations; better end to end delivery.

Reform via buying actions; safety, cost, speed, and quality; data sharing; investment in training.  All parts of the playbook to be passed down into the supply chain.  Meeting everyday needs of users and VfM for taxpayer.

Beginning from page 14, the five phases are examined in order:

  • Preparation and planning;
  • Publication;
  • Selection;
  • Evaluation and Award;
  • Contract Implementation.

Stage one: Preparation and planning

Stage 1 : Preparation and planning

Pipelines, portfolios and longer term contracts

pp16 – the conflicting desire for longer term contracts but more involvement of the acknowledge higher likelihood of innovative SMEs is left with contracting authorities to reconcile.  Indicating that contractual performance metrics should include this on a VfM basis.  Early market engagement deemed an essential means to do this.  As is feedback being sought directly from the supply chain.

Playbook indicates the solution to SME capacity constraints is using JVs and consortia with SME involvements.  This is not consistent with aims of platform solutions or the procurement options posed on pp34

This also conflicts with the cross-referenced GovS008 Commercial Functional Standard and National Infrastructure and Construction Procurement Pipeline 2020/21

Stage 1 : Preparation and planning

Modern methods of construction

pp18 – contracting authorities are left to determine how to assess MMC wider value to project and programme outcomes.

Harmonise, digitise, and rationalise demand.

pp18 Collaboration between contracting authorities is encouraged.  Aiming at standardised interoperable components across a spectrum of suppliers.  pp19 – achieved by “standardising and digitising specifications; shared design content and approaches across portfolios” supporting wider government priorities. 

Quality Planning | Platform approaches | Targets for MMC

Product platforms are encouraged to standardised assemblies, and cross-sector collaborations of standardised purchasing.  Procurement encouraged to steer markets and suppliers toward these platform approaches.

pp20  Offsite construction to be treated as favourable.  This is now an expectation of departments.

Targets for MMC .  IPA and Department for Business Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) are developing a common set of metrics to better understand and support performance, which will include metrics to demonstrate supply chain engagement.

Further embed digital technologies

Seeking to collate and improve quality of data using the UK BIM Framework.  Standardised information requirements, exchange, and security.  A common framework of standards and protocols.  Digital twin goals also associated with future performance and asset management.

Stage 1 : Preparation and planning

Early Engagement and clear specifications

Early engagement – earlier identification of delivery and risk challenge; options; relationship building across the whole supply chain.  pp22-23 tested at first business case stage but note the complications anticipated in fair marketplace and transparency.  [This seems to conflict with drive for innovation.  How can innovation and open market discussion be accommodated together?]

Innovation – pp23 – open to new ways of thinking; revisiting processes and continuous improvement.  [This seems to conflict with standardisation (and collaborations across sectors and platforms).]

Social value and SMEs – pp23 – early engagement suggested to engage with SMEs and to wider social value initiatives. [this is however left with the supply chain to manage amongst itself – see next]

Early supply-chain involvement (ESI)

Deemed to offer more effective design solutions and overall VfM.  Includes formal engagement of Tier 1 alongside Tier 2 and 3.

pp24 – ESI deemed to need good leadership, governance, commercial management, and wider strength in capability. Above all, building trust with open and collaborative process “in sharing ideas and innovative solutions”. [it remains unclear how commercial sensitivity can sit alongside incentive to share innovation. In this early stage any optioneering opportunity and early evaluation of risk alongside a public sector is lost. Instead reliant upon the supply chain to organise itself across competitive boundaries away from public sector stewardship or prioritisation.]

Outcome based approach

pp24 – Outcomes focused on whole life value, performance, and cost; to include social value model in informing procurement route.  Outcomes, not scope, to unlock innovation and continuous improvement.  Outcomes defined at outset.  Clear and measurable.  Definition of “whole life value” being developed with industry in 2021. [the key question will be how is short-term VfM and long-term asset value to be reconciled against short-termism politics and similarly short-term media and public attention – government and politics are the only influence able to redirect these messages by long-term planning of their own.]

pp25 – Design underpinned by stakeholder informed objectives which meet requirements and specifications.  Specification that are not too prescriptive to allow for innovative solutions.  [These goals seem contradictory.  How is it possible to define all stakeholder needs; develop design against clear specifications; allow for innovative solutions; support standardising solutions and cross-sector platforms across long-term strategic partnerships; and present all necessary information to promote fairness to bidder decision making. This is a wish list – not clear delineation of how to prioritise and why]

It is also envisaged that there will be several design and specification stages but no means to envisage how this will be supported by the necessary upfront stakeholder management, control, and clarity of priority that will not suit all.

See also:  Infrastructure Procurement RoadMap 2013; Collaborative models of construction procurement 2014

Stage 1 : Preparation and planning

People and Governance

Approvals follow Green Book and Orange Book requirements. 

Contracting authorities are required to have streamlined approval processes geared toward outcome success; consider strategic approach and by extension to focus upon additional means to identify portfolio potential; account for complexity, cost, and risk determining rigour of process; use “Should cost” benchmarking; involve accountable Senior Role Owners (SROs) who own the business case and cross-functional teams.

See page 73 matrix.  OKUA.  Owner (Joint-Owner); Knowledge experts; Understanding; Awareness.  [this seems to create difficulty when separating accountability and responsibility]

Stage 1 : Preparation and planning

Deliver Model Assessments (DMA)

Part of First Business Case stage.  Objectives and outcomes defined from the outset.  See pp33 for DMA and pp34 for five potential approaches.  Five potential approaches namely: Transactional – traditional standard competitive service delivery

Hands-on Leadership – complex and in need of close supervision and active stakeholder management more than cost focus.

Product Mindset – lessons learnt focused for optimisation via repeatable manufacturing type approach.

Hands-off design – outcome focused without specifications that influence solution.

Trusted Helper – client is focused upon core business and seeks a supplier who can work within the operating procedures or technical challenges better than the client.

[in the absents of early engagement and proactive public sector input – contractors are likely to develop assumed risk profiles based upon these five approaches – particularly if public sector simply return to contract only interest as the hands off means of project control]

Stage 1 : Preparation and planning 

Effective contracting

Project scorecards are being tested through 2021.  There are intended to be integrated into business case baseline post completion.  Reference is also made to them being part of the project contract and KPIs.  [Note: no specific reference to them forming part of project controls beyond contract]

Key performance indicators are deemed part of a  good contract – includes appropriate specifications and performance indicators; incentivising the priority outcomes; proportionate to project size and complexity; quantifiable and measurable metrics; and inline with wider government metrics; and top three metrics available to public scrutiny.

Commercialise the delivery model means being specific about intended benefit and value and chosen with these at the core of the decisions made.  “One of the most effective ways to deliver outcomes is to create contracting environments that promote collaboration and reduce waste.  Contracts should create positive relationships and processes designed to integrate and align multiple parties’ commercial objectives and incentives” pp40.  [Why focus on contract for positive relationships?  This is cooperation. To collaborate a closer relationship is necessary. Building a shared control environment seems much more collaborative if sharing is a key desire.]

Commercial approach “how much delivery responsibility are we willing, able, or need to take on?” pp41

Procurement strategy consider award method; design responsibility; coordination and integration responsibility. [this is where the lack of clear accountability statements in page 73 “OKUA” invites delegated ownership risk].

Contracting strategy pp42 this seeks early risk allocation; roles / responsibilities and rights / obligations being allocated directly into contract.  Contract deemed the place where key elements of project including specifications.  [Compare this to other guidance on acceptable contract forms and boilerplate clauses on pp43 and 44, which is prescriptive to three forms.  By this early commitment to contract form, this falls into the ‘risk transfer in preference to risk management and control’ trap].

Keeping bid costs down and use of frameworks. [this will be good news for long-term relationships but it is inevitably going to stifle competition.  The relationships with SME supply chain within JVs not with Government is inevitable.  Whilst this page acknowledges the SME barrier to entry of bid cost, all wider sentiment of engaging via JVs of tier one contractors’ conflicts with any means to accommodate SME directly and more efficiently.]

Stage two : Publication

Stage 2 : Publication

Going to tender

Setting the tone encourages upfront preparations prior to going to tender.  It also cross-references the Supplier Code of Conduct v.2 dated February 2019 which whilst not legally binding does offer direct access to the Central Commercial Teams in the Cabinet Office (and in extreme circumstances Gareth Rhys Williams as Government Chief Commercial Officer via pp5 of this CoC).  This code states, “risk is allocated to the party best able to manage it…share intelligence on supply chain risk…we will endeavour to create and maintain a culture that facilitates collaboration between all suppliers and government…” (pp7 ibid).  “we expect suppliers to avoid passing down unreasonable levels of risk to subcontractors who cannot reasonably be expected to manage or carry these risks” pp10 ibid).  https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk

Procurement timelines are to be supported with early market engagement and avoidance of inadequate timescales being set.

Risk Management is required to be collaborative but also across portfolios [does this mean government is best able to manage more risk?].  Internal control, and proactive approach is referenced pp47 [but this is in the context of contracts and commercial lifecycle].  Risk appetite is referenced in context of innovation but also references optimal outcomes [rigid contract forms do not support this sentiment]

Stage 2 : publication

Risk allocation

pp48 Risks owned or jointly owned by parties best able to manage them and supported by good risk management and be subjected to extensive scrutiny prior to going to market.  [it is not clear what this scrutiny would entail but reference to National Audit Office suggests the VfM trap.]

Risk allocation is to be considered against practical and financial means to absorb it.  A good approach is deemed to focus upon market testing and balance of risk; risk focus against objectives; use of a risk allocation matrix based upon means to manage; joint risk registers.  [there is no reference to early identification of critical controls best suited to manage risk identified]

Fair return is intent upon avoiding cost driven impacts upon project success, with a profitable outcome to supply chain deemed a sustainability objective.

Stage 2 : Publication

Payment mechanism and pricing approach

Output drivers should be central to payment and the level of risk around the scope and requirements.  pp50 Fixed pricing or scale based upon scope uncertainty are deemed appropriate [this indicates risk is to be treated as a tradeable commodity, not a threat to outcome].  Do’s focus on early warning and joint-decisions, outcomes focus, indexation, and data sharing.  Don’ts list lack of clarity in scope and evaluation; liability limits; avoiding risk pricing due to time constraints; and avoiding the transfer of information gap risk to supply chain.  [there is no consideration given to the control environment beyond contract and price]

Onerous contracts pp51 is a term used to trigger discussion with supplier on cause and options.

Further reading: Green Book; Orange Book; Outsourcing Playbook; Cabinet Office Two Stage Open Book; Construction Hub Value Toolkit.

Section three : Selection

Section 3 : Selection

Due diligence during selection

SQ Standard Selection Questionnaire to be used.  Payment systems to be assessed for all contracts over £5m p.a.

Section 3 : Selection

Assessing economic and financial standing of suppliers.

Key principles financial standing to perform work; be fair and transparent to not prejudice competition; use Contract Tiering Tool.

Stage four : Evaluation and award

Stage 4 : evaluation and award

Evaluating bids and contract award

Value over cost pp56, and social value pp57, low-cost bidding is defined as anything more than ten percent below average or the Should Cost estimates – and are referred to Cabinet Office pp58

Stage 4 : evaluation and award

Resolution Planning and ongoing financial monitoring

Assessment of impact of supplier failure, and upfront resolution planning.  Note it is the supplier who is required to provide Service Continuity Plans and exit plans; separate from contracting party’s contingent plans [no reference to shared project plans].  Financial mitigations include bonds, PCGs.  Project bank accounts to be used as standard.

Supplier Failure Contingency Planning template concludes with a resourcing and funding strategy; stakeholder and supply chain details; risk register.

Stage five : contract implementation

Stage 5 : contract implementation

Successful relationships

pp64 successful relationships deemed to be means for better VfM and advocates standard forms of contract.  Early engagement to include delivery teams and designers.  Management of contract deemed key early strategic decision.  pp66 principles of collaboration, openness, transparency, and flexibility referenced based upon contractual delivery; role allocations; and upfront agreement to dispute resolution. [no reference to decisions of critical controls only contract management].

Reference to one team “win together, fail together”, [but no expansion on what this approach means.]

Early workshops suggested to set expectations of standards, behaviours, and ways of working, success criteria, impact on wider goals [seems a little late to be considering behaviours as these are generally set into a project by the way it was set-up.  Perhaps this would be better as a KPI of the governing party…]

Stage 5 : contract implementation

Transition to Operation

pp68 Prepare from set-up.  Soft landings deemed to be smooth transition from construction to operations.

Exchanging data is included as a critical success factor, and referenced “golden thread” of intended purpose of building or infrastructure.

Pre-handover is focused upon pre-sign off and references as-builts; transfer of information to operator; end user orientation; CDM files; and aftercare plans.  Additional control is envisaged via contract and wrap up contracts in timely manner.  [the lack of ongoing project governance and shared controls makes this process highly contractual in nature and inherently less collaborative as a result.]

Lessons Learnt stated as ongoing process during a project and feedback presented via Cabinet Office email address [no project sharing beyond the public sector entity appears to be considered].

v | b | trust

The remainder of this article will focus upon relationships, cooperation or collaboration, and the sentiments of trust that result.

The distant observer further highlighted

This distant buyer sentiment that public sector becomes in construction is not a new phenomena. It is characteristic of public sector. My MSc dissertation revisit of PFI concluded the buying attitude of the authority party was hands-off in the extreme. Reliance on others to do the checking and the terms of contracts to offload the risk if all else failed. The distant public sector interest inevitably offering space for the ebb and flow of very different powers and influence to take hold over time. This Construction Playbook offers little to suggest anything beyond fire and forget contract control will remain.

Project Control

There is no focus on critical project controls per se. Internal control, and proactive approach to risk management is referenced pp47 but this is in the context of contracts and commercial lifecycle. KPIs and pay mechs geared towards outcomes; risk allocation; control; and reporting; is all driven through contract management. Frameworks, standardised contracts, boilerplate clauses, are all advocated. This seems completely at odds with efforts to develop collaborative one project ideas. Contracts should create positive relationships and processes designed to integrate and align multiple parties’ commercial objectives and incentives” pp40. Key performance indicators are deemed part of a good contract.

Deliver Model Assessments (DMA) offers five potential types but there is no guidance on how this will change control environment or wider governance.  See pp33 for DMA and pp34 for five potential approaches.

Flexible or fixed?  pp42 contract is required to allocate agreed risk allocations and specifications into contracts.  Managing relationships (pp66 referenced one team “win together, fail together” but no expansion on what this approach means.  Both these sentiments are at odds with the wider sentiment to commit to specific contract forms. Compare this to other guidance on acceptable contract forms and boilerplate clauses on pp43-44, which is prescriptive to three forms.

Role allocation is based upon the internal owner, adviser, and awareness needs.  No consideration is given to project roles therein, and no accountability vs responsibility considerations (cf. pp 73 matrix).  Contracting parties are encouraged to consider award method; design responsibility; coordination and integration responsibility.  However, this is where the lack of clear accountability statements in page 73 “OKUA” invites delegated ownership risk.

Pre-handover is focused upon pre-sign off and references as-builts; transfer of information to operator; end user orientation; CDM files; and aftercare plans.  Additional control is envisaged via contract and wrap up contracts in timely manner.  The lack of ongoing project governance and shared controls makes this process highly contractual in nature and inherently less collaborative as a result.

Lessons Learnt – No project sharing beyond the public sector entity appears to be considered.

Risk Management

There is reason to be nervous that deep pockets syndrome will continue. Party best able to manage doctrine is maintained.  Risks owned or jointly owned by parties best able to manage them pp48, “a good approach is deemed to focus upon market testing and balance of risk; risk focus against objectives; use of a risk allocation matrix based upon means to manage; joint risk registers”.  However, later statement clarifies that risk allocation is to be considered against practical and financial means to absorb it.

This document also cross-references the Supplier Code of Conduct.   This code states, “we expect suppliers to avoid passing down unreasonable levels of risk to subcontractors who cannot reasonably be expected to manage or carry these risks” pp10 Supplier Code of Conduct).

Risk allocation appears to be a tradeable commodity not a threat to success.  Outputs and the level of risk around the scope and requirements should be key to payment mechanisms.  Fixed pricing or scale based upon scope uncertainty are deemed appropriate (pp50).  Risk should be subjected to extensive scrutiny prior to going to market (pp48).  It is not clear what this scrutiny would entail but reference to National Audit Office suggests the VfM trap that plagued PFI.

Bigger picture required.  Risk Management is required to be collaborative but also across portfolios. How does this work between contracting parties? Procurement timelines are to be supported with early market engagement and avoidance of inadequate timescales being set. Supplier Failure Contingency Planning template concludes with a resourcing and funding strategy; stakeholder and supply chain details; risk register.

Conclusion : a step closer but not a bridge

There is reason to applaud this new engagement and initiative to present greater clarity of how construction is to be procured across the public sector. My concern remains that this guidance continues a long tradition of them and us contracting with the private sector. A buyer attempting to present a united front but not a uniting goal. As this country looks to build its way through the 21st Century I hope this is just the first step toward closer ties and smarter buys. But to collaborate is to take account of all sides. To lead is to be presenting clarity of vision, interest in control, and steps that build trust between parties, not better contracts for when one falls.

A step in the right direction. But plenty more to go…

About Me

In psychology we are required to look beneath the mask. This blog series is attempting to unmask some hidden parts of projects to engender a more collaborative way.

Find my professional mask here:

RACI to the top

We are all responsible to uphold accountability better

Accountability – not a pass down but maybe its a pass-back.

This is a long read. It has been a long write. If you invest a little time with this paper you may come away with new and challenging questions for your client or your boss. If you are the client or the boss, you may find reason to take these same questions and ask them to whomever that is to you.

The project management and organisational tool principally addressed in this article is collectively referenced as a Responsibility Assignment Matrix (RAM), of which the RACI is perhaps most generally referred. RACI is further detailed herein.

Introduction

If you initiate a project – but have need of expert others to deliver it for you – what happens to the accountability?  Who owns the success or failure in realising the change intended by this project aim?  Is your accountability able to be delegated?  Has your accountability been passed down from your boss? What about the responsibility for specific stages or tasks within the project?  Is this the same thing?

As leaders or managers, if we do not clearly define roles and hierarchy in what we oversee, we fail.  If delegations are assigned without defined parameters of autonomy, we fail.  All attempts at management of projects, risk and people become incomplete.  Implementation of internal controls; assessment of capability; adequacy of resource; assurance of governance; decision efficacy; all becomes inherently fragile, confused, and incomplete.

This article gives background to how our project literature, industry, and our academic class represent the means of defining roles between project actors.  It highlights where some of this thinking funnels us into a colloquial interest mindset, and with some of the contemporary academic research to hand, I present what appears a rather dramatic example of modal confusion.  Dramatic because it seems almost universally framed.  The good news is, a simple solution is available, and one practicable without much change to existing tools or practices required.  Tools such as RACI can be better framed, better contextualised, and keep us all actively part our project(s); not sitting at distance with our divided interests to defend.

One academic perspective

A clarity of what academic literature presents in addressing these questions has been prepared by a series of peer reviewed published work of Steve McGrath and Stephen Whitty from the University of South Queensland. Writing a number of related papers from 2015 to 2020 in the International Journal of Managing Projects in Business. In 2018, McGrath and Whitty outlined the sparsity of literature attempting to examine accountability vs responsibility. This paper specifically sought to clarify meaning for these two terms.  Beginning with an extensive database interrogation of 48,006 search results; reduced to 426 peer reviewed original articles; each with relevant responsibility or accountability context.  Of these 426 articles only two were determined to offer suitably generic definitions.  These two articles were Ieraci (2007) and Cornock (2011), (McGrath et al 2018, pp689).  Their 2018 paper was a follow up to McGrath and Whitty (2015), where the wider subject of definition confusion had been applied to governance more generally.

The following extract presents a useful context for this articles UK focus, taking us right back to historic origins.

The system of government in Britain, following sealing of the Magna Carta in 1215 at Runnymead, evolved over centuries by way of constant tension between King, Nobles, the middle class and the Church (Macfarlane 2000). There was a constant struggle for power within an institutional system where no one group could ever completely dominate the others, as happened with monarchies in Europe until the French revolution. So, accountability was embedded within the British system via a means of everyone protecting their interests, rather than via any moral obligation on a king to ‘be good’.  The concept of accountability is highly relevant to organisations whose shareholders (or taxpayers or members) need to be able to hold their agents to account and with whom there is some form of obligation or contractual or legal relationship or responsibility. Introducing the concept of accountability at this point is a suitable means to accommodate the change in boundary conditions that adding the prefix ‘organisational’ to the word ‘governance’

McGrath and Whitty, (2015 pp780)

This 2015 paper concludes that we need to account for hierarchy or levels of governance that exists.  Therein, better definitions can “separate the how (governance and process) from the what (content and strategy); remove the incompatible influence of competing frameworks; [and] do not confuse or mix (subversive) democratic and authoritarian artefacts (competitive and cooperative structures)”  (ibid pp785).  Of the areas of potential definitional confusion, “responsibility and accountability” are stated expressly (ibid, pp786).  This then connects to their follow up paper of 2018 from which I draw upon in application to commercial projects, particularly those of large scale construction..

Here are the definitions of accountability and responsibility McGrath and Whitty (2018) present. I short-cut over a significant and thorough examination of lexicographic and academically derived appropriation of best fit. Definitions as follows:

Responsibility: an obligation to satisfactorily perform a task

Responsible: accepting responsibility i.e., accepting an obligation to satisfactorily perform a task.

Accountability: liability for ensuring a task is satisfactorily done

Accountable: having accountability i.e., having liability for ensuring a task is satisfactorily done

McGrath et al (2018 pp701 – 702)

McGrath et al (2018) then further indicate that sources of liability referred could reflect origins of organisational, legislative, contractual, or informal (in social setting) as a wide array of possible source.  However, in attempting to reflect this transient nature of accountability through these levels of organisational or contractual management, this makes any universal tool open to misunderstanding or confusion (ibid pp702).  It is therefore recommended by McGrath at al to exclude accountability from RAMs completely, separately noting formal localised accountability in a separate matrix if such a need still exists (ibid pp703).

Professional bodies perspective

In conclusion to the McGrath et al 2018 examination of accountability and responsibility, the 2018 paper’s constraints of enquiry are again presented, “…this paper dealt solely with the question of definition and made no comment on any other normative aspects of responsibility or accountability as applied to any field.” (McGrath et al 2018 pp705).  For context therefore, I present some additional examination of industry text as applicable to UK Project Management.

What follows is critique I have prepared for contemporary context, plus summary of findings from McGrath et al of earlier versions. I have critiqued the most recent Book of Knowledge from the APM, 2019.  McGrath and Witty (2018) have critiqued PRINCE2, and PMI, 2004 (as the earliest origins of PMIs use of RACI language defined below).  A summary of each critique is offered here.  I finish this section with some specific observations related to the UKs HM Treasury 2020 Construction Playbook.

Association of Project Management

The 2019 version of APMs Book of Knowledge (AMPBoK) principally addresses accountability as part of Governance.  A responsibility assignment matrix is referenced as the tool which clarifies role accountability and responsible for activities and decisions (page 32).  Governance informing delegated authorities and escalations.  The term accountable is used 14 times, accountability 15.

The Sponsor is accountable for realisation of benefits and validity of business case.  Potential for delegation or independent check is acknowledge (page 40, 44).  In deciding to continue across decision gates, sponsor and the wider governance board are accountable (page 77), the sponsor is then accountable to ensure authorities are in place as compliance requirements of teams (page 77), governance (page 32, 40, 233), decision communication (page 200), tracking benefits (page 10, 92) and close-out reports, perhaps as delegated responsibility via a PMO (page 96).  The transient nature of accountability that is permitted by this APMBoK therefore at odds with the shifting between organisational levels that McGrath et al are seeking to avoid (McGrath et al 2015 pp703).

In my view, the APMBoK is not intending to address the interface into construction.  It instead parks up on the edge of the construction phase, but does not drop into this space.  It separates the contractors ‘project’ (page 24) and Section 4.3.2 Contract Management presents a series of controls and contract management supports but with client in mind (page192, and figure 4.3.2).  A principal contractor’s engagement of second or third tiers of suppliers is further acknowledged (page 38) but only considered in terms of balancing internal organisational talent development. This seems an important omission to raise, as I believe much of the modal confusion I write of elsewhere see construction folk talking to buyers of their services in the same language but with different levels of hierarchy on their mind.

To this end the APMBoK reference to a responsibility assignment matrix (page 32) is perhaps also intended to be through this narrower lens.  The APMBoK use of the term Accountability presents further reason to suppose this is the case.  Different people may have accountability for permanent and temporary organisational structures (page 46, 24), embedding change, or extending life-cycle, may require retained accountability of a project team (page 92, 211), accountability for achieving the project success criteria at time of project handover resting with the project manager and thereafter benefits realisation with the sponsor (page 154).

In APMBoK language this enables accountability to therefore be separately identified at two or more levels.  First, the organisational level that much of our project management literature truly focuses upon.  Second, the construction contract becomes an interface by which we can separate the “temporary organisation structure”, in place to deliver this phase. Accountability free to move across these interfaces. This is problematic, as McGrath et al would agree.

PRINCE2

Defined roles and responsibilities are one of 7 principles of PRINCE2, it is also the focus of their organisation theme.  In my opinion PRINCE2 is not a useful reference point for construction project management. It lacks a clear means to manage the interfaces of key project phases like Construction, where significant and influential factors of control would be passing over commercial boundaries.  Notwithstanding, McGrath et al (2018) references to PRINCE2 conclude it is failing to make adequate distinction between responsibility and accountability (ibid pp689).

PMI 2004 and RACI

McGrath and Whitty (2018) present the PMI PMBoK (3rd edition 2004 pp206), in reference to the responsibility assignment matrix (RAM) commonly known as RACI.  This edition being the first introduction of the RACI model. As McGrath (ibid) explain, RACI is coded:

R = Responsibility

A = Accountability

C = Consult

I = Inform

McGrath et al then offer a case study where the A for Accountability becomes problematic. The modal confusion I reference elsewhere evidenced by an example of a multi-functional Government Department.  McGrath et al explain the department’s attempts to apply such a RACI matrix across management levels within the organisation was frustrated by the difficulty in applying accountability at more than one level.  Only resolved when attempting to address RACI differently as it is expanded into a multimodal form.

HM Government Construction Playbook

UK HM Treasury, Infrastructure and Projects Association, “Construction Playbook” version 1.0 was issued December 2020.  Herein “the Playbook”.  This is the most contemporary document reflecting how government are now setting themselves up to procure construction. In the UK this playbook is how construction projects are intended to be brought to market.  This is what it has to say about roles and responsibilities.

According to the Civil Service Chief Operating Office, Alex Chisolm, the Construction Playbook reflects upon the delegation of responsibilities and working together, aligning efforts, and ensuring actions are consistent and reinforced and is “the result of extensive collaboration from across the public and private sectors to bring together expertise and best practices” (ibid pp1).

I read the motivation in the Playbook to be not one of granular operational clarity, but rather of general representation of role allocation within Government areas. Policy 4 of 14, is “People and Governance” (pp28).  This section addresses compliance, approval processes, Senior Responsible Owners (SROs), cross-functional teams, Major Projects portfolio, and opportunity framing workshops.  This is supported by cross-reference to an appended introductory section (pp72 ff) which includes Figure 4 outlining roles and responsibilities (ibid pp73).

Accountable Senior Role Owners (SROs) are said to own the business case but the language used within the Playbook here indicates the same interchangeable use of both accountability and responsibility that McGrath et al had observed as a hitherto normalised conflation of different terms.  Page 26 of the Playbook, the introduction of the Senior Responsible Owners and Cross-Functional teams, states “Project or programme senior responsible owners (SROs) own the business case and are accountable for delivery of the project or programme and its benefits and outcomes. They should fully understand the governance and approvals process and commit sufficient time to lead the project or programme through approvals and delivery.” (ibid, page 26).

What should also perhaps be noted here is the intended cross-functional interactions between central and local government outlined in the Playbook.  Page 72 presents additional explanation as to whom the Playbook is aimed at, and the list reflects the areas of Commercial, Financial, Project Delivery, Policy, and wider professional parties.  The Playbook addresses all professionals across the contracting authorities “who are responsible for the planning and delivery of public works projects and programmes”.  These aims go on to state “the key is ensuring that we have joined-up teams with input from the right functions early in the process”. Nor is this Playbook to be read in isolation.  Approvals follow HM Treasury Green Book and Orange Book requirements.  Accordingly, the Playbook is also presented as a useful reference for others with decision-making, approval, or assurance need.  This list includes Ministers, Permanent Secretaries, Accounting Offices, Commercial Directors, project sponsors and SROs (ibid pp73).

For this Playbook, the key delineations of ownership are within figure 4, pp71.  The acronym OKUA is used:  Owner (or Joint-Owner); Knowledge experts; Understanding; Awareness.  Ownership can therein be split between several functions with J-O used to indicate cross-party sharing of Ownership.  Reading from this figure 4, it is of some note that the Commercial function has at least part ownership to all but three of the 14 categories; sharing four of these with Programme and Operations, and two of these with Finance. McGrath et al (2018), advise us to avoid shared allocations as it relates to Accountability (to which I would infer Ownership within the OKUA best reflects). 

The final observation to reflect here is that the OKUA matrix in the Playbook is therefore only representing the functions of Public Sector.  The external delegations between contracting authorities and the supply chain are dealt with in Policy 6.  This is entitled, “Effective Contracting” (pp38 ff).  Allocation here is in the context of procurement strategy and specifically which party (e.g., contractor or architect or the Contracting Authority) is to be made responsible for design, coordination, and integration (ibid pp41).  Contracting strategy thereafter requires documenting decisions on contractual roles and responsibilities (ibid pp42).

Combining these accounts into one

The Playbook is offering a distinction between what is being delegated by contract, and what is being allocated by the OKUA metric.  If working from highest levels of interests to lower, the Accountability appears to be OKUAs “Ownership” as allocated, most frequently, to the Commercial department.  Policy 6, “Effective Contracting”, the transferred Responsibility.  Liability for a project phase may legally transfer across this boundary, but the distinction I make here is the accountability beyond what may or may not have legal application.  It is from this position I believe we can seek to use RAM and/or RACI in a multi-layered way to these construction projects being procured via this Playbook. The interpretation of RACI however, needs to then be understood against these wider ownerships. Key to using RACI across these projects is how the Ownership aka Accountability is considered from layer to layer of project organisation, hierarchy, and onward transmission through an elongated construction supply chain.

Accountability only travels up | Responsibility is what is passed down

In cross-reference to both Ieraci (2007) and Cornock (2011), McGrath et al (2018) recommendation pp704 is to keep Accountability separated when using a RAM.  Instead, we can adapt the A in RACI, to mean having the delegated Authority and/or power of Approval.  The example by McGrath et al is a Project Manager in public sector who has authority to approve specific levels of work but not all.  This is as distinct from being Accountable. Accountability does not feature in the RAM. I would argue nor does Accountability move from the Owner roles stated in the Playbook OKUA. What is delegated is authority, or approvals. As McGrath et al argue, attempts here are therefore to create universality of labelling not meaning (McGrath 2018 pp 704).

The context of project then becomes important. For purposes of clarity between contracting parties, the Accountability of the project success sits with the Project Sponsor.  The Project Sponsor however is operating within the parameters of the authority or approvals the power above them has delegated. This continues back up to the OKUA level where the Ownership or Accountability still ultimately resides.

Stepping across this commercial boundary from Project Sponsor to the Construction Contractor, authority and approvals have also been passed via the terms of the contract of construction. This is when the recognition of project as having a nuanced meaning is important. It may be that the Construction supply chain deem this collective of construction activity to be their project.  In which case any discussion by parties within this construction project will be looking to their most senior person as the accountable role.  However, if responsibility matrices are being prepared that are to be shared with the Project Sponsor, and their engagement with this Construction supply chain as tier one, tier two, tier three, etc., it can only be the Project Sponsor who is being deemed to be accountable.  The most senior person within the Construction supply chain is now the first recipient of the delegated authority to act on behalf of the Project Sponsor.  They may have approvals to conduct their business as they see fit, and within legally defined terms they have accepted financial consequence in failing to do so, but that is not to excuse the Project Sponsor of accountability in the context of the project success.  If this subtlety can be accommodated across the layers of project hierarchy, a RAM becomes a tool able to transverse these layers and become a shared tool accordingly.  From within a project boundary the top most position may have accountability.  But when looked upon from outside in, this is Approval or Authority, and the accountability sits there above.

Why is this so important?

This creates a clarity.  Precisely what RACI as a tool is supporting across the project framework of critical controls .  It is the antidote to what obfuscates defensive decision-making (Gigerenza 2014) or any attempts to filter blame.  It places more demands upon the Project Sponsor which compels behaviour reflective of their role.  They re-enter the discussion of what is to be reported but also what it is they can add to the process in what is to be monitored.  What is to be checked by independent means, and why.  Crucially, they are required to have interest and ownership of the control environment of which this RACI is a part.  To be invested in the welfare and effectiveness of the project partners they engage.  No longer is it acceptable to say, “I did not know”.  If you chose not to look, not to ask, not to make sure, that is for you as the Project Sponsor to explain, not be the means to apply the blame. Accountability does not transfer with the contract, the interest in the contract succeeding becomes more important than how the contract can pass the blame.

Contracts remain, but alongside controls

We currently use contracts to replace trust.  That is a poor substitute when the benefits of the project are necessarily put first.  No legal changes to frameworks or duty of care are envisaged.  However, the wider control environment becomes more important than the financial security of the contract.

v | b | t

This amendment to RACI is intended only to change behaviour and attitudes towards the wider project controls.  Particularly in positions of leadership and authority.  If we insist on knowing what the accountable person is doing to safeguard both project aims and all parties within, we can evaluate them based upon v | b | t .

We have means to ask more pertinent questions.  As project sponsor what gives you adequate visibility?  How has the project framework of controls been necessarily attended to, to identify the range of behaviours possible across the project actors?  Are both appropriate to the level of trust you share?  Has procurement strategy and control framework of project been considered to best protect both project aims and all actors involved.  Demonstrate the concern for everyone’s well-being, not just your own.

McGrath and Whitty remarks to conclude

The extension of these same ideas are motivated from precisely the conclusions McGrath et al (2018) make themselves.  The conclusions of McGrath et al read much better than I could offer.  Accordingly, I will lean again upon them for the last word.

Adoption and use of the refined definitions developed in this paper, together with alteration of the “A” in the RAM RACI code from accountability to approve, can provide clarity of meaning, avoiding uncertainty, confusion, and misunderstanding. This can benefit the community in general and project management practitioners and researchers in particular, saving time, resources, and money.

Through providing greater clarity, these findings also have the potential to improve project delivery through benefiting organisational recruitment, selection, and induction process, providing a basis for motivating and rewarding employees and assisting with staff termination processes. They can also potentially result in greater clarity in contracts, potentially minimising disputes during and after project delivery.

Successful application of the definitional refining method also indicates its potential suitability for application to other contested terms.

McGrath and Whitty, 2018, pp706

Credit and acknowledgements

Much of this article is influenced by the McGrath and Whitty papers of 2015 and 2018 referenced below.  I would encourage a wider read of McGrath and Whitty’s work.  Much of their recent work is freely accessible via Google Scholar, I also provide the link to the published version via Emerald of the 2018 paper.  Access to APM PRINCE2, and PMI BoKs are subject to the terms of each organisation.  The UK Construction Playbook is a matter of public record at Gov.uk

References:

Stephen Keith McGrath, Stephen Jonathan Whitty, (2015),”Redefining governance: from confusion to certainty and clarity”, International Journal of Managing Projects in Business, 8-4 pp. 755 – 787

McGrath, SK., Whitty, S,J. (2018), “Accountability and responsibility defined”, International Journal of Managing Projects in Business, Vol. 11 No. 3, pp. 687-707. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJMPB-06-2017-0058

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Further research:

These notes are part of a wider ongoing enquiry into seeking better collaborative ways to facilitate more successful project outcomes.  Using critical controls and tools beyond project contracts, of which a RAM or similar is assumed to be a central part.  Additional research will revisit more specific construction industry literature and guidance.  Wider modelling from psychology are also intended to be introduced.  In the interim these notes are my current findings which have further highlighted where visibility | behaviour | trust also play a part.

Disclaimers:

It should be noted that these notes have been written with an intended academic rigour.  No original work is claimed here, other than practical application of existing academic literature.  This article has not undergone any form of peer review, nor subjected to supervision by anyone with Doctorial or equivalent qualification or experience, or therefore vetted by the ethical standards of a university body.  Stephen McGrath has been made aware of these notes for information, but no representation is made to his approval, or my authority to write in his name.  I have made all attempt to therefore present a visibility of sources and behaviours I consider appropriate to academic writing.  However, judgements upon the academic merit or trust to all content herein, are yours alone to make.

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About the Author:

Warren Beardall MSc, BSc (Hons) MIRM

Managing Consultant, MYR Consulting (Europe) PTY Ltd.

In my consulting work with tier one construction contractors in the UK, the clarity of role allocation is an integral part of the critical control environment being assessed. This paper integrates my own learning in facilitating this consulting, with the detailed examinations of the academic and industry practice I research.  It presents an argument as to why I think modal confusion confronts our industry when these tools are applied.

For twenty years, MYR Consulting (Europe) PTY Ltd and our parent company in Australia, have been helping clients mitigate their risk of professional error.  Often our engagements begin with an introduction via Professional Indemnity insurers.  Sometimes we are invited in before such needs arise.  I would summarise our involvement as helping highly capable people and their internal control environments to be a cohesive whole.  The controls helping the people, the people challenging and determining best practice the control environment reflects.  Both aimed toward the consistent success of the design management processes they support, and the projects they form part.

Within this consulting work, role clarity is an integral part of de-risking process for the benefit of both the company and the wider project outcomes they serve.

About Me

In psychology we are required to look beneath the mask. This blog series is attempting to unmask some hidden parts of projects to engender a more collaborative way.

Find my professional mask here: